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THE TORTURE LAWYERS 
MICHAEL P. SCHARF* 
INTRODUCTION 
Some truths are inconvenient; some are stranger than fiction. This one 
might be characterized as both.1 This is the true story of how, in the months 
following the attacks of 9/11, the legal policy of the U.S. government with 
respect to the war on terrorism was hijacked and dictated by a cabal of four 
highly placed government lawyers who called themselves the “War 
Council.”2 Together, they produced a series of legal memoranda which 
deliberately ignored adverse precedent, misrepresented legal authority, and 
were written to support a pre-ordained result, namely to “eliminate any 
hurdles posed by the torture law.”3 
The looming presence behind the group was Vice President Dick 
Cheney, who was a strong proponent of the principle Inter Arma Enim 
Silent Leges (in times of war the law must be silent). He believed that the 
president had to be unshackled from the constraints of international law in 
 
 * Michael Scharf is the John Deaver Drinko-Baker & Hostetler Professor of Law, and Director 
of the Frederick K. Cox International Law Center, Case Western Reserve University School of Law. 
 1. The issue of potential prosecution of former Bush Administration officials involved in the 
drafting of the Torture Memos has been extremely politically divisive and has put the Obama 
Administration in a difficult position. Tim Reid, Photos Bring New Claims that Military Abused 
Prisoners, THE TIMES (LONDON), April 25, 2009, at 51. 
 2. See JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE BUSH 
ADMINISTRATION 22-23 (2007). 
 3. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY REPORT, INVESTIGATION INTO THE 
OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL’S MEMORANDA CONCERNING ISSUES RELATING TO THE CENTRAL 
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY’S USE OF “ENHANCED INTERROGATION TECHNIQUES” ON SUSPECTED 
TERRORISTS 160 (2009), [hereinafter OFFICE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY REPORT], available at http:// 
judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/OPRFinalReport090729.pdf; see also id. at 3, 9, 51-52, 159, 226-28 
(indicating instances in which the legal memoranda ignored adverse precedent, misrepresented legal 
authority, and supported a pre-ordained result). This article relies only on the factual findings of the 
Office of Professional Responsibility Report; the report’s legal conclusion that John Yoo had 
committed professional misconduct was subsequently overturned by the Deputy Attorney General. See 
Memorandum for the Attorney General from David Margolis, Associate Deputy Attorney General, on 
Memorandum of Decision Regarding the Objections to the Findings of Professional Misconduct in the 
Office of Professional Responsibility’s Report of Investigation into the Office of Legal Counsel’s 
Memoranda Concerning Issues Relating to the Central Intelligence Agency’s Use of “Enhanced 
Interrogation Techniques” on Suspected Terrorists (Jan. 5, 2010) [hereinafter Memorandum for the 
Attorney General from David Margolis], http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/ 
DAGMargolisMemo100105.pdf. 
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order to successfully combat the new terrorist threat.4 As he explained, 
“We also have to work through sort of the dark side, if you will . . . . It is a 
mean, nasty, dangerous, dirty business out there, and we have to operate in 
that arena.”5 
The self-anointed “War Council” in turn was led by Vice President 
Cheney’s chief counsel and trusted lieutenant, David Addington, about 
whom it was said, “if you favored international law, you were in danger of 
being called ‘soft on terrorism.’”6 Addington played a large role in shaping 
the content of the torture memoranda.7 The second dominant figure was 
Jim Haynes, the chief counsel of the Department of Defense—a political 
appointee who had served as best man at Addington’s wedding.8 The third 
figure in this group was White House Chief Counsel, Alberto Gonzales, 
who famously declared after the 2001 U.S. invasion of Afghanistan that the 
Geneva Conventions were “quaint” and outmoded and did not apply to this 
new war on terror.9 
But the most important member of all turned out to be a young 
Berkeley law professor named John Yoo.10 Like the other members of the 
“War Council,” Yoo “defined himself as a partisan Republican” who was 
devoted to the political success of his party and president.11 Yoo was 
brought on board to serve as deputy head of the Department of Justice’s 
Office of Legal Counsel (“OLC”), a government office with extraordinary 
power to issue memoranda interpreting the government’s requirements 
under the U.S. Constitution and federal statutes. Yoo had come to the 
White House’s attention because he had authored a series of law review 
 
 4. See ABC News: Cheney Defends Hard Line Tactics (ABC television broadcast Dec. 16 2008), 
available at: http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/story?id=6464697. In this interview Dick Cheney admitted 
that he felt waterboarding was “appropriate,” that he “had the Justice Department issue the requisite 
opinions” to facilitate waterboarding, and that he actively helped “get the process cleared.” Explaining 
his mindset, Cheney said: “when you contemplate the 9/11 with terrorists instead of being armed with 
box cutters and airline tickets, equipped with a nuclear weapon or a biological agent of some kind in the 
middle of one of our cities and think about the consequences of that and then I think we’re justified in 
taking bold action.” 
 5. Quoted in Cassandra Burke Robertson, Beyond the Torture Memos: Perceptual Filters, 
Cultural Commitments, and Partisan Identity, 42 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L. L. 389, 397 (2009). 
 6. PHILIPPE SANDS, TORTURE TEAM: RUMSFELD’S MEMO AND THE BETRAYAL OF AMERICAN 
VALUES 213 (2008). 
 7. OFFICE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY REPORT, supra note 3, at 51-52. 
 8. SANDS, supra note 6. 
 9. Memorandum from Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to George W. Bush, President, on Decision 
Re Application of the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War to the Conflict with Al Qaeda and the 
Taliban (Jan. 25, 2002) [hereinafter Alberto R. Gonzales Memo] (reprinted in Appendix, 37 CASE W. 
RES. J. INT’L L. 615 (2006)). 
 10. OFFICE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY REPORT, supra note 3, at 26. 
 11. Robertson, supra note 5, at 394. 
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articles arguing for near limitless powers of the presidency during crisis.12 
He was a “true believer” in his client’s cause,13 and a prolific writer; and it 
was his work product that would in a few years garner the mantle, “White 
House Torture Memos.”14 
This article recounts the story about how these four individuals 
intentionally cut off the government’s primary experts on the Geneva 
Conventions, the Torture Convention, and customary international law 
from the decision making process. In doing so, they presented a one-sided 
and distorted view of U.S. obligations under international law that led to a 
widespread government policy and practice of torture. It also reveals how a 
trio of important Supreme Court precedents disrupted these plans, and 
ultimately swung the balance back in favor of compliance with 
international law. 
The information relied on for this article comes from the findings of 
the bipartisan Senate Armed Service Committee report following extensive 
hearings into the matter in the summer and fall of 2008;15 the July 2009 
Department of Justice Ethics Probe whose conclusions were made public in 
February 2010;16 the personal recollections of two of the major players in 
this saga—Jack Goldsmith17 and John Yoo18—as contained in their 
memoirs; the reflections of William Taft and John Bellinger—the two State 
Department Legal Advisers who were in office during the period of the 
“Torture Memos”; and in limited instances other first-person accounts 
recorded by scholars. From these sources, the article seeks to distill the 
essential lessons necessary for the government to avoid the possibility that 
a small group like this could ever pull off another “policy coup d’état” in 
the future. 
 
 12. OFFICE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY REPORT, supra note 3, at 26. 
 13. Robertson, supra note 5, at 395. 
 14. OFFICE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY REPORT, supra note 3, at 227 (“According to [CIA 
Director] Rizzo, there was never any doubt that waterboarding would be approved by Yoo, and the 
client clearly regarded OLC as willing to find a way to achieve the desired result.”). 
 15. See S. ARMED SERVICES COMM., INQUIRY INTO THE TREATMENT OF DETAINEES IN U.S. 
CUSTODY (2008), http://armed-services.senate.gov/Publications/Detainee Report Final_April 22 
2009.pdf [hereinafter S. ARMED SERVICES COMM., INQUIRY]. 
 16. See OFFICE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY REPORT, supra note 3. This article relies only on the 
factual findings of the Office of Professional Responsibility Report; the report’s legal conclusion that 
John Yoo had committed professional misconduct was subsequently overturned by the Deputy Attorney 
General. See Memorandum for the Attorney General from David Margolis, supra note 12. 
 17. See GOLDSMITH, supra note 2. 
 18. See JOHN YOO, WAR BY OTHER MEANS: AN INSIDER’S ACCOUNT OF THE WAR ON TERROR 
(Atlantic Monthly Press, 2006). 
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I. THE TORTURE MEMOS 
A. Legal War Council – Minus L 
The story behind the White House Torture Memos begins soon after 
the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 and the U.S. invasion of 
Afghanistan. Rather than follow the traditional practice of vetting questions 
related to the interpretation of international law through the legal 
departments of all the relevant agencies, the “War Council” (Gonzales, 
Addington, Haynes, and Yoo) pursued a strategy of excluding the high 
level government lawyers from other departments who possessed the most 
expertise and institutional experience in this area.19 Most notable in this 
regard was the State Department Legal Adviser, William Taft, who headed 
an office of 170 international law specialists known as “L.” The Legal 
Adviser is appointed by the president with the advice and consent of the 
Senate. His rank within the Department of State is equivalent to that of an 
Assistant Secretary of State, and he answers directly to the Secretary of 
State. “L” is responsible for furnishing legal advice on all problems, 
domestic and international, that arise in the course of the work of the 
Department of State. While “L” may be little known outside government 
circles, the importance of the office is considerable: traditionally no foreign 
policy decision can be made without first receiving clearance from “L,” 
and no delegation can be sent to an international negotiation or 
international organization without a representative of “L.” Just as the 
Solicitor General is the government’s point man for constitutional 
questions, the Legal Adviser is the government’s principal expert in 
international legal affairs. And just as the Solicitor General argues cases for 
the government before the U.S. Supreme Court, the Legal Adviser argues 
on behalf of the United States at the International Court of Justice and other 
international tribunals.20 
John Yoo has been quite open in explaining why the “War Council” 
cut the State Department Legal Adviser out of the decision-making process 
concerning treatment of detainees: “The State Department and OLC often 
disagreed about international law. State believed that international law had 
a binding effect on the President, indeed on the United States, both 
internationally and domestically,” whereas Yoo and the other members of 
the “War Council” did not hold to that view.21 William Taft in turn 
 
 19. SANDS, supra note 6, at 213. 
 20. MICHAEL P. SCHARF & PAUL R. WILLIAMS, SHAPING FOREIGN POLICY IN TIMES OF CRISIS: 
THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT LEGAL ADVISER xix (2010) 
[hereinafter SCHARF & WILLIAMS, SHAPING FOREIGN POLICY]. 
 21. YOO, supra note 18, at 33. 
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observed that the State Department Legal Adviser was likely excluded due 
to the fear, “in light of some of the positions we had taken, that we would 
not agree with some of the conclusions other lawyers in the [Bush] 
Administration expected to reach and that we might leak information about 
the work to the press.”22 
The “War Council” used heightened categories of classification in 
order to keep the State Department Legal Adviser out of the loop. As the 
Justice Department Office of Professional Responsibility explained: 
We found that the limitations imposed on the circulation of the [OLC] 
draft were, in part, based on the limited number of security clearances 
granted to review the materials. This denial of clearances to individuals 
who routinely handle highly classified materials has never been 
explained satisfactorily and represented a departure from OLC’s 
traditional practices of widely circulating drafts of important opinions 
for comment. In the end, the restrictions added to the failure to identify 
the major flaws in the OLC’s legal advice.23 
B. Circumventing the Geneva Conventions 
The four Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols establish 
the core obligations of states during an armed conflict.24 They are widely 
considered to be the rulebook governing the lawful conduct of warfare. 
Every U.S. military officer is extensively schooled in the substance and 
application of this body of law.25 
The Geneva Conventions require states to provide certain rights and 
protections to non-combatants, wounded soldiers, and prisoners of war.26 In 
 
 22. William H. Taft IV, The Bush (43rd) Administration – William H. Taft IV (2001-2005), in 
SCHARF & WILLIAMS, SHAPING FOREIGN POLICY, supra note 20, at 130. 
 23. OFFICE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY REPORT, supra note 3, at 260. 
 24. For the full text of the Four Conventions and the Additional Protocols, see Geneva Convention 
for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of 
Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 
U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 
U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in 
Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287; Protocol Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed 
Conflicts, opened for signature Dec. 12, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3; Protocol Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed 
Conflicts, opened for signature Dec. 12, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609. 
 25. See SANDS, supra note 6, at 33; see also MARK OSIEL, THE END OF RECIPROCITY: TERROR, 
TORTURE, AND THE LAW OF WAR 332-33 (2009). 
 26. The Conventions primarily govern conflicts between States, while the Additional Protocols 
establish further obligations for non-international armed conflicts (civil wars). The United States has 
ratified the four Conventions but has not ratified the Additional Protocols. 
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particular, the Conventions, through Common Article 3, set forth the rights 
of persons “taking no active part” in an armed conflict, including freedom 
from torture and inhumane treatment, limits on interrogation, and access to 
judicial process.27 
When seeking to develop a legal framework for the detention and 
treatment of suspected terrorists, John Yoo believed “[t]he candid approach 
would be to admit that our old laws and policies did not address this new 
enemy [al Qaeda].”28 Acting according to this perspective, Yoo drafted a 
series of legal memoranda, which concluded that under international law 
the protections of the Geneva Conventions did not apply to Afghanistan, to 
the Taliban, or to members of al Qaeda. These conclusions were supported 
by White House Counsel Gonzales and submitted to the President for his 
approval. 
On January 9, 2002, Yoo authored a key OLC memorandum, 
providing legal arguments to support Bush administration officials’ 
assertions that the Geneva Conventions did not apply to al Qaeda and 
Taliban detainees from the war in Afghanistan.29 On January 22, 2002, Yoo 
authored a second memorandum responding to White House Counsel 
Gonzales’s request for the Department of Justice’s views concerning the 
effect of international treaties and federal law on prisoners held by U.S. 
forces in Afghanistan.30 The OLC memorandum advised that the president 
had “sufficient grounds to find that these treaties do not protect members” 
of al Qaeda or the Taliban militia. Importantly, the memorandum also 
concluded that “customary international law, as a matter of domestic law, 
does not bind the President, or restrict the actions of the U.S. military, 
because it does not constitute either federal law made in pursuance of the 
Constitution or a treaty recognized under the Supremacy Clause.”31 
 
 27. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed 
Forces in the Field art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention for the 
Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea 
art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of 
Prisoners of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention Relative to 
the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 
287. 
 28. YOO, supra note 18, at 47; see also id. at 22. 
 29. Memorandum from John Yoo, Deputy Ass’t Att’y Gen., to William J. Haynes, Gen. Counsel 
of the Dep’t. of Def., Application of Treaties and Laws to al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees (Jan. 9, 
2002), available at http://www.gwu.edu~nsarchivNSAEBBNSAEBB12702.01.09.pdf. 
 30. Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Ass’t Att’y Gen., to Alberto Gonzalez, Gen. Counsel to the 
President, and William J. Haynes, Gen. Counsel of the Dep’t of Def., Re: Application of Treaties and 
Laws to al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees (Jan. 22, 2002), 
news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/doj/bybee12202mem.pdf (written by John Yoo). 
 31. Id. at 36. 
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Repeating the arguments contained in Yoo’s memoranda, on January 
25, 2002, Gonzales sent a memorandum to President Bush, which opined 
that the president should declare the Taliban and Al Qaeda outside the 
coverage of the Geneva Conventions.32 This, Gonzales pointed out, would 
keep American interrogators from being exposed to the War Crimes Act, a 
1996 law that makes it a federal crime to cause a grave breach of the 
Geneva Conventions or a violation of Common Article 3, which prohibits 
torture or other inhumane treatment.33 Gonzales’s memorandum also 
argued that the new paradigm of the “war” against terrorism “places a high 
premium on other factors, such as the ability to quickly obtain information 
from captured terrorists and their sponsors,” and thus the Geneva 
Conventions’ strict limitations on the questioning of enemy prisoners were 
“obsolete” and even “quaint.”34 
When he learned of the Gonzales memorandum, Secretary of State 
Colin Powell quickly prepared his own memorandum for the White House, 
stating that the advantages of applying the Geneva Conventions to the 
Afghan detainees far outweighed those of their rejection.35 Powell 
explained that declaring the Conventions inapplicable would “reverse over 
a century of U.S. policy and practice in supporting the Geneva Conventions 
and undermine the protections of the laws of war for our troops.” He added 
that it would “undermine public support among critical allies,” who might 
be less inclined to turn over suspected terrorists. 
Secretary Powell’s memorandum was accompanied by a legal 
memorandum from State Department Legal Adviser William Taft, which 
concluded that the Geneva Conventions did apply to the conflict with the 
Taliban, as well as to al Qaeda, because they were part of the conflict with 
the Taliban. The Taft memorandum found that the United States was bound 
by customary international law and that such law required that detainees be 
treated humanely and that they were entitled to many of the rights 
contained in the Conventions.36 Finally, the Taft memorandum also opined 
that it is important for the United States to confirm “the United States bases 
 
 32. Alberto R. Gonzalez Memo, supra note 9. 
 33. Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2441(d)(1) (2000). 
 34. Alberto R. Gonzalez Memo, supra note 9, at ii. 
 35. Memorandum from Colin L. Powell, U.S. Sec’y of State, to Alberto R. Gonzales, Gen. 
Counsel to the President, Draft Decision Memorandum for the President on the Applicability of the 
Geneva Convention to the Conflict in Afghanistan (Jan. 26, 2002), reprinted in Appendix: The White 
House Torture Memoranda, 37 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 615 (2006). 
 36. Memorandum from William H. Taft, IV, The Legal Adviser, Dep’t of State, to Alberto R. 
Gonzalez, Counsel to the President, Comments on Your Paper on the Geneva Convention (Feb. 2, 
2002), reprinted in 37 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 615 app. (2006). 
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its conduct not just on its policy preferences but on its international legal 
obligations.”37 
On February 7, 2002, the President signed an executive memorandum 
accepting the legal conclusion of the OLC that the Geneva Conventions did 
not apply to the conflict with al Qaeda as it was not a High Contracting 
Party to the Conventions. The memorandum provided that although legal 
authority existed to suspend the application of the Conventions as between 
the United States and Afghanistan, he would not do so at that time, and that 
the Geneva Conventions would apply to the conflict with the Taliban. The 
memorandum further concluded that Common Article 3 of the Geneva 
Conventions did not apply to al Qaeda and Taliban detainees as “the 
relevant conflicts were international in scope, and common Article 3 
applies only to ‘armed conflict not of an international character.’”38 With 
respect to Taliban detainees, the memorandum concluded they “[were] 
unlawful combatants and, therefore, [did] not qualify as prisoners of war 
under Article 4 of Geneva.”39 And, because the Geneva Conventions did 
not apply to the conflict with al Qaeda, “al Qaeda detainees also do not 
qualify as prisoners of war.”40 
The presidential memorandum did, however, provide that “[a]s a 
matter of policy, the United States Armed Forces shall continue to treat 
detainees humanely and, to the extent appropriate and consistent with 
military necessity, in a manner consistent with the principles of Geneva.”41 
As recounted by William Taft, in the months following the president’s 
decision, the Legal Adviser’s office drafted a lengthy memorandum “which 
concluded that because our policy was to treat the al Qaeda and Taliban 
detainees consistent with the requirements of the Geneva Conventions, the 
question of whether they were entitled to this as a matter of law was 
moot.”42 According to Taft, the “L” memorandum expressed the continuing 
view that “customary international law required that the detainees in any 
event be treated humanely and had certain of the rights set out in the 
Conventions.”43 
 
 37. Id. at 2. 
 38. Id. at 2(c). 
 39. Memorandum from George W. Bush, President, to Richard B. Cheney, Vice President, et al., 
Humane Treatment of al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees, ¶ 2(d) (Feb. 7, 2002), available at 
www.torturingdemocracy.orgdocuments20020207–2.pdf (alteration in original). 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 3. 
 42. Taft, supra note 22, at 129-30. 
 43. Id. at 130. 
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The State Department Legal Adviser was under the impression that 
because it was official U.S. policy to treat the detainees consistent with the 
protections provided in the Geneva Conventions, they were in fact being 
accorded those protections. As explained by William Taft, “it developed, 
however, that at the same time we were working on our memorandum . . . 
the Department of Justice lawyers were working separately with the 
lawyers at the Department of Defense to authorize certain departures from 
the Conventions’ terms in the treatment of the detainees, particularly with 
regard to methods of interrogation.”44 According to Taft, “My staff and I 
were not invited to review this work and we were, indeed, unaware that it 
was being done.”45 
By shifting the obligation to adhere to the Geneva Conventions from a 
legal obligation to a policy determination, the stage was set for the 
circumvention of the protections provided in the Conventions. As noted by 
Legal Adviser William Taft above, international law is intended to be 
durable, whereas policy determinations can easily and quickly change. 
As will be discussed immediately below, the protections offered by 
the Geneva Conventions were in fact quickly diluted through a series of 
additional legal memoranda prepared by the OLC. Once the U.S. 
government had determined that the Geneva Conventions were not legally 
binding in relation to the al Qaeda and Taliban detainees, it laid the 
foundation for the creation of a law-free zone at Guantanamo Bay; it 
removed the safeguard against inhumane treatment, leaving only the 
outermost standards relating to torture in place; it evaded limits on 
imprisonment—opening the possibility for indefinite detention; it 
eliminated standard military procedures, such as Article 5 hearings to 
determine the combatantnon-combatant status of detainees; and it removed 
due process protections, paving the way for military commissions that 
would not be required to meet even minimal standards. 
C. Presidential Power, Necessity, and the Limits of Torture 
Once the prohibitions on interrogations afforded by the Geneva 
Conventions were deemed inapplicable, the Bush Administration was faced 
with the question of to what extent U.S. military and intelligence personnel 
could employ coercive measures to extract information from detainees. In 
particular, the U.S. government had to decide whether it could lawfully 
employ techniques which one might commonly consider to be torture. 
 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
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The United Nations Convention against Torture sets forth states’ 
obligations to protect persons against state-sponsored torture.46 The 
Convention defines state-sponsored torture as actions inflicting severe 
physical or mental pain or suffering for the purpose of obtaining 
information. The Convention calls on states to implement effective 
measures to prevent acts of torture, to prosecute nationals who commit acts 
of torture, and to provide effective redress to individuals subjected to 
illegal acts of torture. The Convention also prohibits states from turning a 
person over to another state where he or she is likely to be subjected to 
torture. The United States is a party to the Torture Convention and 
implements the Convention through a domestic statute making torture a 
federal crime.47 
On August 1, 2002, the OLC issued two crucial memoranda, drafted 
by Yoo and signed by Assistant Attorney General Jay Bybee, dealing with 
the torture issue. The first, addressed to White House Chief Counsel 
Gonzales, asserted that the obligations under the Torture Convention did 
not apply to conduct outside of the territory of the United States, and that 
the Torture Convention prohibited only the most extreme forms of 
intentionally inflicted harm, namely those causing the most severe physical 
pain tantamount to death or organ failure, or psychological forms of 
pressure that cause permanent or prolonged mental harm. The 
memorandum further noted that this narrow ban applies only when 
interrogators specifically intend such harms but not when they are seeking 
information to defend the nation from attack.48 Importantly, the 
memorandum also declared that under the doctrine of “necessity,” the 
president could supersede national and international laws prohibiting 
 
 46. For the full text of the United Nations Convention Against Torture, see United Nations 
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, June 
26, 1987, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 100–20 (1988), 1465 U.N.T.S. 85. 
 47. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340, 2340A, 2340B (2006). 
 48. See Memorandum from Jay Bybee, Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, to 
Alberto Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Re: Standards of Conduct for Interrogation under 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 2340–2340A, at 3-5, 42-46 (Aug. 1, 2002), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
srv/politics/documents/cheney/torture_memo_aug2002.pdf [hereinafter Bybee, Standards] (written by 
John Yoo); see generally GOLDSMITH, supra note 2, at 145 (discussing how OLS interpreted the term 
“torture” too narrowly). The memorandum advised that any interrogation methods that do not violate 
the prohibition on torture found in domestic law, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340–2340A, which required intent, also 
do not violate obligations under the Torture Convention because of the United States’ understanding 
attached to the Convention. The memorandum also advised that interrogators could inflict pain and 
suffering on detainees up to the level of causing “organ failure” without violating the domestic and 
international prohibition on torture and cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment. The OLC derived its 
definition of torture from a statute that authorized benefits for emergency health conditions, using the 
phrase “severe pain” as a possible indicator of an emergency condition that might cause serious harm if 
not immediately treated. 
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torture.49 This has come to be referred to as the “ticking time bomb 
exception.” The memorandum also found that for it to be a war crime, 
torture must be committed against someone protected by the Geneva 
Conventions, and the United States had established that al Qaeda and the 
Taliban did not have this protection. 
The second August 1 OLC memorandum, which responded to a 
request from the CIA, addressed the legality of specific interrogation tactics 
to be used against Abu Zubaydah, a high-level al Qaeda operative who the 
CIA believed was withholding information regarding terrorist networks in 
the United States and Saudi Arabia. The CIA was convinced that Zubaydah 
knew of plans to conduct attacks against U.S. interests, but that he had 
become accustomed to less-aggressive interrogation techniques and would 
not disclose the necessary information unless extraordinary techniques 
were employed.50 The memorandum reviewed ten types of proposed 
interrogation techniques including walling, insects placed in a confinement 
box, cramped confinement, stress positions, sleep deprivation, and water 
boarding.51 The memorandum reasoned that none of the proposed 
techniques came within the threshold of “severe pain or suffering” or 
mental pain. In particular it found that “the water board is simply a 
controlled acute episode, lacking the connotation of a protracted period of 
time generally given to suffering.”52 Based on its conclusion that mental 
harm comes only from prolonged duration (months or years), the 
memorandum opined that water boarding should not be prohibited.53 Abu 
Zubaydah was subsequently water boarded eighty-three times in August 
2002.54 
Two months later, on October 11, 2002, the Commander of 
Guantanamo Bay, Major General Michael Dunlavey, sent a memorandum 
to the Pentagon requesting that the U.S. military be granted similar 
authority to use aggressive interrogation techniques that were originally 
designed to simulate abusive tactics used by our enemies against our own 
 
 49. See Bybee, Standards, supra note 48, at 39-41. 
 50. Memorandum from Jay Bybee, Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, to John 
Rizzo, Acting Gen. Counsel, Cent. Intelligence Agency, Interrogation of al Qaeda Operative, 1 (Aug. 1, 
2002), available at http://www.derechos.org/nizkor/excep/zubaydah.pdf [hereinafter Bybee, 
Interrogation]. 
 51. Ten types of action are proposed: (1) Attention grasp, (2) Walling, (3) Facial hold, (4) Facial 
slap, (5) Cramped confinement, (6) Wall standing, (7) Stress positions, (8) Sleep deprivation, (9) Insects 
placed in a confinement box, and (10) Waterboarding. Id. at 2. 
 52. Id. at 11. 
 53. Id. 
 54. See Scott Shane, Waterboarding Used 266 Times on 2 Suspects, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 2009, 
available at www.nytimes.com20090420world20detain.html. 
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soldiers, including tactics used by the Communist Chinese to elicit false 
confessions from U.S. military personnel. These included “stress 
positions,” “exploitation of detainee fears,” “removal of clothing,” 
“hooding,” “deprivation of light and sound,” “deprivation of sleep,” and 
“water boarding.” Dunlavey’s memorandum stated that the existing 
techniques permitted by the Army Field Manual 34-52 had been exhausted, 
and that some detainees (in particular, Mohammed al Qahtani, a Saudi 
Arabian believed to be the twentieth 911 hijacker) had more information 
that was vital to U.S. national security. 
At this point the professional military lawyers began to raise serious 
concerns about the treatment being accorded detainees, and in particular 
concerning the proposed methods of interrogation. In response to General 
Dunlavey’s requests, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General 
Richard Myers solicited the views of the several branches of the military. 
All stated their opposition to the proposed extraordinary interrogation 
techniques. The senior lawyer for the Air Force cited “serious concerns 
regarding the legality of many of the proposed techniques.” The Chief of 
the Army’s International and Operational Law Division wrote that the 
techniques “cross the line of ‘humane’ treatment” and would “likely be 
considered maltreatment” under the Uniform Code of Military Justice and 
“may violate the torture statute.” The senior lawyer of the Marine Corps 
stated that the requested techniques “arguably violate federal law, and 
would expose our service members to possible prosecution.”55 
At this time, the State Department Legal Adviser remained shut out of 
the process. It is worth speculating whether if “L” had joined the campaign 
on the side of the professional military lawyers, this combined effort might 
have been sufficient to steer U.S. policy back within the framework of 
international law. 
Despite the concerns raised by the senior lawyers of the military 
services, on November 27, 2002, Jim Haynes, the Pentagon’s chief lawyer 
(and a member of the “War Council”), sent a one-page memorandum to 
Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, recommending that he approve the 
techniques requested by Guantanamo Bay. A few days later, on December 
2, 2002, Secretary Rumsfeld signed off on Haynes’ recommendation.56 By 
December 30, 2002, the interrogators at Guantanamo Bay were employing 
the extraordinary interrogation techniques (including hooding, removal of 
clothing, stress positions, twenty-hour interrogations, and use of dogs) on 
 
 55. S. ARMED SERVICES COMM., INQUIRY, supra note 15, at xviii. 
 56. Id. at xix. 
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Mohammed al Qahtani and several other detainees.57 In January 2003, 
these same techniques were being used at the U.S. detention center at 
Bagram Airfield in Afghanistan, and eventually migrated to the Abu 
Ghraib detention facility in Iraq.58 
During this period, Navy General Counsel Alberto Mora intensively 
engaged with Haynes concerning his reservations about the interrogation 
techniques that had been approved for Guantanamo Bay, opining that they 
“could rise to the level of torture,” and “could threaten Secretary 
Rumsfeld’s tenure and could even damage the Presidency.”59 He prepared a 
memorandum to that effect, which he threatened to sign unless he heard 
definitively that the use of the techniques had been suspended. 
In part as a result of Mora’s concernsthreats, Secretary Rumsfeld 
signed a memorandum rescinding authority for the techniques on January 
15, 2003. That same day, Rumsfeld directed the establishment of a 
“Working Group” to review the interrogation techniques and requested 
another legal opinion from OLC in light of the objections that had been 
raised.60 Importantly, the working group did not include the State 
Department Legal Adviser. 
On March 14, 2003, John Yoo provided an OLC memorandum to the 
Working Group that repeated much of what the first Bybee memorandum 
had said six months earlier about the definition of torture.61 In addition, it 
advised that interrogators could not be prosecuted by the Justice 
Department for using interrogation methods that would otherwise violate 
the law because federal criminal laws of general applicability do not apply 
to properly authorized interrogations of enemy combatants undertaken by 
military personnel in the course of armed conflict. The basis for this finding 
was that “such criminal statutes, if they were misconstrued to apply to the 
 
 57. See id. at xx. 
 58. See id. at xxii-iii. In his “insider’s account of the war on terror,” John Yoo dismisses the 
migration theory as “an exercise in hyperbole and partisan smear.” YOO, supra note 18, at 168. 
According to the bipartisan Senate Committee Report, however, “The abuse of detainees at Abu Ghraib 
in late 2003 was not simply the result of a few soldiers acting on their own. Interrogation techniques 
such as stripping detainees of their clothes, placing them in stress positions, and using military working 
dogs to intimidate them appeared in Iraq only after they had been approved for use in Afghanistan and 
at GTMO [Guantanamo Bay].” S. ARMED SERVICES COMM., INQUIRY, supra note 15, at xxix. 
 59. S. ARMED SERVICES COMM., INQUIRY, supra note 15, at xxi; id. at 107. 
 60. Id. at xxi. 
 61. Memorandum from John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, 
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to William J. Haynes II, Gen. Counsel of the U.S. Dep’t of Def., Military 
Interrogation of Alien Unlawful Combatants Held Outside the United States [hereinafter Military 
Interrogation of Alien Unlawful Combatants Held Outside the U.S. Memo], available at 
www.aclu.orgpdfssafefreeyoo_army_torture_memo.pdf. 
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interrogation of enemy combatants, would conflict with the Constitution’s 
grant of the commander in chief power solely to the president.”62 
Yoo’s March 14 memorandum also asserted that based on the U.S. 
reservation to the Convention against Torture, “the United States’ 
obligation extends only to conduct that is ‘cruel and unusual’ within the 
meaning of the Eighth Amendment or otherwise ‘shocks the conscience’ 
under the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.”63 
In response to the State Department Legal Adviser’s earlier assertions 
concerning customary international law, the memorandum argued that 
customary international law could not impose a standard that differs from 
U.S. obligations under the Convention against Torture, and those 
obligations must be narrowly interpreted through U.S. domestic law. The 
memorandum went further to assert that, “[i]n any event, our previous 
opinions make clear that customary international law is not federal law and 
that the President is free to override it at his discretion.”64 The 
memorandum concluded with a reaffirmation and possible expansion of the 
ticking time bomb exception by noting that necessity or self-defense could 
provide defenses to a prosecution based on allegations that an interrogation 
method might violate any of the various criminal prohibitions.65 
Armed with the new OLC memo, on April 16, 2003, Secretary 
Rumsfeld authorized twenty-four specific interrogation techniques for use 
at Guantanamo Bay. In addition, the secretary’s memorandum stated that 
“if, in your view, you require additional interrogation techniques for a 
particular detainee, you should provide me, via the Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, a written request describing the proposed technique, 
recommended safeguards, and the rationale for applying it with an 
identified detainee.” Rumsfeld subsequently approved specific requests for 
hooding, sensory deprivation, and “sleep adjustment.”66 
According to the December 2008 Senate Armed Services Committee 
Report, “senior officials in the United States government solicited 
information on how to use aggressive techniques, redefined the law to 
create the appearance of their legality, and authorized their use against 
detainees.”67 The Committee found that the Secretary of Defense’s 
authorization of aggressive interrogation tactics were a direct cause of 
detainee abuse at Guantanamo Bay and contributed to the use of abusive 
 
 62. Id. at 1. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 2. 
 65. Id. at 74-80. 
 66. S. ARMED SERVICES COMM., INQUIRY, supra note 15, at xxii. 
 67. Id. at xii. 
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tactics in Afghanistan and Iraq.68 Specifically with respect to the 
memoranda written by the OLC, the Report states: “Those OLC opinions 
distorted the meaning and intent of anti-torture laws, rationalized the abuse 
of detainees in U.S. custody and influenced Department of Defense 
determinations as to what interrogation techniques were legal for use 
during interrogations conducted by U.S. military personnel.”69 
By interpreting away the obligations of the Torture Convention, the 
U.S. Government opened itself up to the possibility that its military and 
intelligence personnel might cross the line, and that abuses would migrate 
from the highly monitored Guantanamo interrogation center to detention 
facilities in Afghanistan and Iraq. According to William Taft, it is “highly 
regrettable that the Legal Adviser’s Office was not involved in the legal 
work following the decisions in February 2002”; had “L” been involved, 
“several conclusions that were not consistent with our treaty obligations 
under the Convention against Torture and our obligations under customary 
international law would not have been reached.”70 
II. REALIGNING U.S. INTERROGATION POLICY AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 
In late 2003 and 2004, U.S. policy began to haltingly realign with 
international law. This realignment was driven by greater public awareness 
of the conditions of detention of suspected terrorists, personnel change at 
the OLC, the intervention of Congress and the Supreme Court, and the 
reengagement of “L.” 
A. OLC Rescinds the Yoo Memo 
In October 2003 Jack Goldsmith became head of the Department of 
Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel. Early in his tenure Goldsmith withdrew 
the controversial August 1, 2002 and March 14, 2003 OLC opinions that 
described what constituted prohibited acts of torture and whether the 
federal torture statute would apply to U.S. military interrogations of 
“unlawful enemy combatants.”71 Goldsmith explained that he rescinded the 
torture memoranda because he thought the memoranda “rested on cursory 
 
 68. Id. at xxviii. 
 69. Id. at xxvii. 
 70. Taft, supra note 22, at 130. 
 71. GOLDSMITH, supra note 2, at 141-60. 
SCHARF__FINAL_JCI_1.DOC 6/11/2010  3:24:00 PM 
404 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 20:389 
and one-sided legal arguments,” and were “legally flawed, tendentious in 
substance and tone, and overbroad and thus largely unnecessary.”72 
Goldsmith, however, did not rescind the second August 1, 2002 OLC 
memorandum, issued to the CIA, which concluded that specific proposed 
techniques including water boarding were compatible with international 
law.73 Goldsmith left the memorandum to the CIA in place in order to 
provide CIA personnel with what Goldsmith describes as a “golden 
shield”74 that would protect them against prosecutions under the Federal 
War Crimes Act (implementing U.S. obligations under the Geneva 
Conventions) and the Federal Anti-Torture Act (implementing U.S. 
obligations under the Torture Convention).75 The effect was, however, to 
permit the continued and expanded use of water boarding and other abusive 
techniques by CIA interrogators. Goldsmith also drafted a March 19, 2004 
memorandum, which opined that it was legal for the United States to seize 
noncitizens from Iraq or other territory over which it exercises de facto 
control and transfer them for purposes of interrogation in other countries. 
This memorandum provided legal cover for the CIA’s controversial policy 
of “rendition.”76 
B. Legislative and Judicial Responses 
In 2005, the U.S. Congress passed the Detainee Treatment Act 
(popularly known as the McCain amendment),77 which provided that 
detainees held in U.S. military custody were entitled to the protections of 
 
 72. Id. at 149, 151. According to John Yoo, notably, the 2004 OLC memo that replaced Yoo’s 
2002 work contained a footnote saying that “all interrogation methods that earlier opinions had found 
legal were still legal.” YOO, supra note 18, at 183. 
 73. GOLDSMITH, supra note 3, at 155-56. 
 74. Id. at 144. In explaining why he did not rescind the August 1, 2002 YooBybee memorandum 
to the CIA, Goldsmith writes: “And in contrast to my sense of the Defense Department techniques 
[which Goldsmith believed would be legally justified under proper legal analysis], I wasn’t as confident 
that the CIA techniques [including waterboarding] could be approved under a proper legal analysis. I 
didn’t affirmatively believe they were illegal either, or else I would have stopped them. I just didn’t 
know yet. And I wouldn’t know until we had figured out the proper interpretation of the torture statute, 
and whether the CIA techniques were consistent with that proper legal analysis.” Id. at 155-56. 
 75. Yoo has asserted that Goldsmith’s withdrawal of Yoo’s 2002 opinion was merely “for 
appearances’ sake” to divert public criticism in the immediate aftermath of the Abu Ghraib controversy. 
“In the real world of interrogation policy nothing had changed.” YOO, supra note 18, at 182-83. 
 76. This approach has been described as a “roadmap to the outsourcing of torture and other forms 
of abuse” to Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, & Syria. José E. Alvarez, Torturing the 
Law, 37 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 175, 210-11, 213 (2006). 
 77. Pub. L. 109-148. 119 Stat. 2680, 2739-44 (2005), available at http:thomas.loc.govcgi-
bincpqueryT?&reporthr359&dbname109&. To avoid the President’s threatened veto, the Detainee 
Treatment legislation was revised before enactment to exempt the CIA from its requirements and to 
stipulate that detainees do not have a right to challenge their detention in U.S. court. 
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the Geneva Conventions. While the McCain amendment ended 
extraordinary interrogation by members of the U.S. armed forces, it did not 
apply to CIA personnel, and as a result the interrogations of high-level al 
Qaeda operatives were moved under the control of the CIA. 
Meanwhile, in 2004, 2006, and 2008, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a 
trio of decisions on the detainee issue that began to swing the pendulum 
back in line with international legal standards and away from unfettered 
presidential power in the war on terrorism. In 2004, the Court decided the 
case of Rasul v. Bush, rejecting by a 6-3 majority the president’s contention 
that Guantanamo Bay was outside of the jurisdiction of U.S. courts, and 
ruling that detainees there must be provided access to legal assistance and 
given judicial review of the legality of their detention.78 The Bush 
administration sought to implement the Rasul decision by establishing a 
Combatant Status Review Tribunal at Guantanamo Bay to determine on a 
case-by-case basis the status of the Guantanamo Bay detainees.79 The 
Combatant Status Review Tribunal process did not, however, provide the 
detainees assistance of counsel or any means to find or present evidence to 
challenge the government’s case, and was later overturned by the Supreme 
Court. 
Next, in the 2006 case of Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the Supreme Court 
held by a 5-3 majority that the military tribunals established by executive 
order to prosecute accused al Qaeda terrorists were unlawful because their 
procedures “violate both the Uniform Code of Military Justice and the four 
Geneva Conventions of 1949.”80 The Supreme Court confirmed that 
Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions applied to all Guantanamo 
detainees, whether they were Taliban or al Qaeda. “Common Article 3,” 
wrote the Court, “affords some minimal protection, falling short of full 
protection under the Conventions, to individuals . . . who are involved ‘in a 
conflict in the territory of’ a signatory.”81 The Court reached this 
conclusion by looking at the official commentaries to the Geneva 
Convention, which confirmed its wide scope. The Court invoked the U.S. 
Army’s Law of War Handbook, which described Common Article 3 as “a 
minimum yardstick of protection in all conflicts, not just internal armed 
 
 78. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004). 
 79. U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DEPUTY SEC’Y OF DEF., ORDER ESTABLISHING COMBATANT STATUS 
REVIEW TRIBUNAL (2004), available at www.defenselink.milnewsJul2004d20040707review.pdf. 
 80. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 560 (2006). 
 81. Id. at 562. 
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conflicts.”82 The Court also relied on decisions of the International Court of 
Justice and the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.83 
Shortly thereafter, at the urging of President George W. Bush, the U.S. 
Congress responded by enacting the Military Commissions Act of 2006, 
which provided a legislative basis for military commissions to try unlawful 
enemy combatants at Guantanamo Bay and stripped the federal courts of 
jurisdiction to hear suits by enemy combatants relating to any aspect of 
their transfer, detention, treatment, trial, or conditions of confinement.84 
Two years later, in the case of Boumediene v. Bush, the Supreme Court 
declared parts of the Military Commissions Act unconstitutional, 
determined that the Combatant Status Review Tribunals were “inadequate,” 
and ruled that the 270 foreign detainees held for years at Guantanamo Bay 
have the right to appeal to U.S. civilian courts to challenge their indefinite 
imprisonment without charges.85 Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing for the 
5-4 majority, acknowledged the terrorism threat the United States faces, but 
he declared: “The laws and Constitution are designed to survive, and 
remain in force, in extraordinary times.”86 
On January 14, 2009, Susan Crawford, the Bush administration–
appointed Convening Authority of the U.S. Military Commissions and a 
former chief judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, 
announced the dropping of charges against Mohamed al Qahtani, the 
detainee for whom the enhanced interrogation policy was originally 
designed. Without equivocation, Crawford declared, “We tortured al 
Qahtani. His treatment met the legal definition of torture. And that’s why I 
did not refer the case [for prosecution].”87 
C. The Re-engagement of “L” 
During the final years of the Bush administration, the State 
Department Legal Adviser, which had been frozen out of the initial 
legalpolicy decisions, began to play an increasingly important role in 
seeking to “clarify and adopt a more robust legal framework for the 
 
 82. Id. at 631 n.63. 
 83. Id. at 611 n.40, 631 n.63. 
 84. Pub. L. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006), available at 
www.loc.govrrfrdMilitary_LawpdfPL-109–366. 
 85. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008). 
 86. Id. 128 S. Ct. at 2277. 
 87. Bob Woodward, Detainee Tortured, Says U.S. Official, WASH. POST, Jan. 14, 2009, at A1, 
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/01/13/AR2009011303372 
.html. 
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detention, treatment, and prosecution of captured terrorists.”88 The Legal 
Adviser was effective in working with the Secretary of State to persuade 
the president that most al Qaeda detainees should be moved from CIA 
custody to the military base at Guantanamo Bay, thereby bringing them 
within the coverage of the Detainee Treatment Act. The Legal Adviser was 
also able to convince the White House that the detainees at Guantanamo 
should be granted access to the International Committee of the Red Cross 
(“ICRC”), and the ICRC subsequently issued several reports that put 
pressure on the Bush Administration to make other reforms in its detention 
policies.89 The Legal Adviser was also called on to fulfill the role of 
rebuilding relationships with America’s allies on the question of the 
application of international law in the war on terror.90 In this regard the 
Legal Adviser initiated a series of bilateral and multilateral meetings and 
conferences designed to attempt to harmonize the approaches of America 
and its allies to developing an effective legal framework for combating 
terrorism. The Legal Adviser was also tasked with facilitating interaction 
between the ICRC and the White House, State Department, and the CIA.91 
D. Changing of the Guard 
In the years following the leaked publication of the torture memoranda 
and abuse photos from Abu Ghraib, the debate over the legal framework 
for the conduct of the war on terror had become so intense that it was 
regularly addressed on the campaign trail. During Barack Obama’s 
campaign, Greg Craig, then candidate Obama’s foreign policy adviser and 
later President Obama’s White House counsel, made clear during public 
presentations that the United States’ international legal obligations would 
set the foundation for the Obama administration’s policy decisions.92 
 
 88. John B. Bellinger III, The Bush (43rd) Administration – John B. Bellinger III (2005-2009), in 
SCHARF & WILLIAMS, SHAPING FOREIGN POLICY, supra note 20, at 143. 
 89. Id. at 144. 
 90. For a review of the views relating to the legality of the Guantanamo detentions and the 
treatment of detainees by the UN Secretary-General, the UN Special Rapporteurs on Torture and 
Arbitrary Detention, the U.K. House of Commons, the Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, and the Inter-Am. 
C.H.R., see UN ECOSOC, Comm. On Human Rights, Situation of Detainees at Guantanamo Bay, UN 
Doc. ECN.42006120 (Feb. 15, 2006); Foreign Affairs Comm., Human Rights Annual Report 2005, 
2004–05, H.C. 574, available at http:www.publications.parliament.ukpacm200506 
cmselectcmfaff57457402.htm; Neil Lewis, Red Cross Finds detainee Abuse in Guantanamo, N.Y. 
TIMES, November 30, 2004, at A1; Inter-Am.C.H.R., Detainees at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (March 12, 
2002), available at http:www.photius.comrogue_nationsguantanamo.html. 
 91. Bellinger, supra note 88, at 137. 
 92. See Greg Craig, Remarks at the Council of Foreign Relations Symposium on International 
Law and Justice, Session 2: U.S. Engagement in the International Legal System, (October 17, 2008), 
available at http://www.cfr.org/publication/17579/session_two.html. 
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Among other things, Craig stated that Obama would close the Guantanamo 
Bay detention facility and restore habeas corpus for those detainees, use 
either military courts martial or the federal courts to try detainees, enforce 
the prohibition on torture, and end the practice of secret detentions and the 
practice of extraordinary renditions.93 
Just two days into his presidency, on January 22, 2009, President 
Obama took an important step toward further realigning U.S. policies with 
international law by signing executive orders requiring the closure of the 
Guantanamo Bay facility within twelve months,94 the dismantling of the 
CIA’s network of secret prisons around the globe, and the prohibition on 
the CIA’s use of coercive interrogation methods that deviate from the 
requirements of the Army Field Manual.95 The executive order on 
Interrogations specifically prohibits U.S. government personnel or agents 
from relying on the Bush administration OLC memoranda in interpreting 
federal criminal laws, the Convention against Torture, or the requirements 
of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.96 
CONCLUSION 
The Department of Justice’s 2009 probe into the White House Torture 
Memos included the following observations under the heading 
“institutional concerns”: 
[W]e found that the review of the OLC memoranda within the 
Department and the national security arena was deficient. The 
memoranda were not circulated to experts on national security law in 
the Criminal Division, or to the State Department, which had an 
interest in the interpretation of treaties. Given the significance of the 
issue – opining on the CIA’s use of . . . [extraordinary interrogation 
techniques] to gain intelligence in the absence of clear precedent on the 
issue – and the pressure of knowing that missed intelligence might 
result in another terrorist attack, the memoranda should have been 
circulated to all attorneys and policy makers with expertise and a stake 
in the issues involved.97 
 
 93. James Risen, The Executive Power Awaiting the Next President, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 2008, at 
Week in Review, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/22/weekinreview/22risen.html. 
 94. Exec. Order No. 13,492, 74 Fed. Reg. 4897, 4898 (Jan. 27, 2009), available at http:// 
edocket.access.gpo.gov/2009/pdf/E9-1893.pdf. 
 95. Exec. Order No. 13,491, 74 Fed. Reg. 4893 (Jan. 27, 2009) available at http:// 
edocket.access.gpo.gov/2009/pdf/E9-1885.pdf. 
 96. Id. at 4894. 
 97. OFFICE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY REPORT, supra note 3, at 259-60. 
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It is particularly important to have the State Department Legal 
Adviser’s input in such a case for several reasons. Unlike the lawyers 
involved in the “War Council,” the State Department Legal Adviser must 
be confirmed by the Senate, which ensures that persons with radical 
conceptions of the law will not be appointed to the post. Second, the Legal 
Adviser’s opinion draws on the expertise of 170 international legal experts 
in the office, many of whom have been in the government for many years. 
They therefore have both greater expertise in international law than 
attorneys in the Justice Department or White House, but also have more 
interactions with foreign counterparts and more experience regarding the 
effects of violation of international law on American foreign policy. 
The positions taken by the State Department Legal Adviser and his 
counterparts in the military services during the Bush administration 
demonstrated that important bureaucratic players perceived the Geneva 
Conventions, the Torture Convention, and customary international law as 
applicable and binding. Like the Office of the State Department Legal 
Adviser,98 the legal offices of the various military services were staffed by 
careerists who had internalized and absorbed a strong belief in the 
constraints and value of international law. General Richard Myers, the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff under George W. Bush, explained the 
nature of this culture of compliance in the following terms: “‘We train our 
people to obey the Geneva Conventions, it’s not even a matter of whether it 
is reciprocated – it’s a matter of who we are.’”99 
Importantly, these career lawyers were concerned about the 
repercussions of noncompliance with international law. They repeatedly 
warned about reciprocity costs and the prospects of prosecution for 
violating the international prohibition against torture. Of primary concern 
was the perceived effect on bilateral relations and long-term multilateral or 
systemic reciprocity. 
“To maximize their legal influence, State Department Legal Advisers 
found that they had to be much more than gifted lawyers and 
administrators; they also had to be skillful and sometimes aggressive 
bureaucrats, unafraid to tackle the internecine turf battles that were inherent 
in the interagency process. Often the most important battle was simply to 
ensure that L had a proverbial ‘seat at the table.’”100 
 
 98. Davis R. Robinson, Department of State Legal Advisers’ Roundtable, in SCHARF & 
WILLIAMS, SHAPING FOREIGN POLICY, supra note 20, at 152 (describing L as “the moral conscience of 
American foreign policy.”). 
 99. SANDS, supra note 6, at 33. See also MARK OSIEL, THE END OF RECIPROCITY: TERROR, 
TORTURE, AND THE LAW OF WAR 332-33 (2009). 
 100. SCHARF & WILLIAMS, SHAPING FOREIGN POLICY, supra note 20, at 211. 
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In a handful of notable occasions over the years the State Department 
Legal Adviser has been intentionally kept out of the decision making 
process, even on matters that turned entirely on interpretation of 
international law. This tended to happen when State Department officials 
from other bureaus or government officials from other departments or 
agencies foresaw that “L” would likely oppose a proposed course of action. 
As Davis Robinson, the State Department Legal Adviser during the Reagan 
Administration, put it: “[S]ome policymakers will on occasion assume the 
following attitude: ‘Oh, let’s not involve [L]. First, they are likely to say 
no. Second, they will take forever–they are so slow. And, if you’re not 
careful, once they get involved, they will run away with your store.’”101 
State Department Legal Advisors have acknowledged the following cases 
in which “L” was cut out of the decision making process: the 1980s mining 
of Nicaraguan harbors102 and armed support for the Contras,103 the 1990 
kidnapping Dr. Alvarez-Machain from Mexico,104 and as detailed in this 
article the adoption of policies related to treatment of detainees in the 
aftermath of the attacks on 9/11.105 
The same policy makers that cut the State Department Legal Adviser 
out of the decision-making process, however, display no hesitancy in 
seeking “L”’s assistance in crafting after-the-fact legal justifications for the 
decisions and actions taken. As Stephen Schwebel, a former Deputy Legal 
 
 101. Davis R. Robinson, The Reagan Administration - Davis R. Robinson (1981-1985), in SCHARF 
& WILLIAMS, SHAPING FOREIGN POLICY, supra note 20, at 56. 
 102. Robinson, supra note 98, at 164 (“That was a contrast with the mining of the Nicaragua 
harbors where I’m sorry to say we knew absolutely nothing in advance . . . . But when it comes to use 
of force, I would argue, over the years, there’s been a lot of skepticism about including the lawyers – 
for example, in planning covert operations. As far as I know, in a covert operation international law still 
applies, so if someone’s going to undertake some secret operation involving the use of force, it’s better 
to have the legal argument in place before undertaking it.”). 
 103. Abe Sofaer, Department of State Legal Adviser’s Roundtable, in SCHARF & WILLIAMS, 
SHAPING FOREIGN POLICY, supra note 20, at 166 (“[W]hen they don’t ask us it’s almost always a 
disaster. I think you could do a chart and show that when the Legal Adviser was not consulted about 
some major use of force or some major foreign issue, it would often turn out to be an Iran-Contra or 
some other mistake of that scale. They don’t talk to us then because they don’t want to be told ‘no’ . . . 
.”). 
 104. Abe Sofaer, The Bush (41st) Administration - Edwin D. Williamson (1990-1993), in SCHARF 
& WILLIAMS, SHAPING FOREIGN POLICY, supra note 20, at 93 (“The Alvarez-Machain case is another 
example . . . of . . . the strong correlation between disastrous policies and failure to consult in advance 
with the international lawyers. In the Alvarez-Machain case, not only was the Legal Adviser’s office not 
consulted, but the Justice Department didn’t even consult the White House. They went ahead and seized 
this doctor from Mexico in a secret operation and brought him to the United States, took the case all the 
way up to the Supreme Court, and then lost the trial. It had a negative affect on our foreign policy, and 
several countries required that we provide assurances that we would not kidnap citizens from their 
territory.”). 
 105. Taft, supra note 22, at 129-30. 
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Adviser who later served as president of the International Court of Justice, 
once remarked: “The . . . [Legal Adviser] is always called in to pick up the 
pieces even if he was not influentially involved in the initial 
decision . . . .”106 Thus, in relation to the mining of Nicaragua’s harbors, 
former Legal Adviser Davis Robinson said: “[As it turned out], all that the 
lawyers could contribute was assistance in after-the-fact containment of a 
train wreck. I remember one Secretary of State under whom I served 
stating: ‘I have only one rigid rule and that is, don’t ever let me be 
blindsided.’ I can only have wished that this sensible rule had applied to L 
as well.”107 
Former UK Legal Adviser Sir Frank Berman offers a comparative 
perspective on this problem: 
Probably the most notorious incident where the UK Legal Adviser was 
deliberately cut out of the loop was the 1956 Suez invasion. But I 
would say that the lessons of that experience have generally been 
learned for the future. It is considered a cardinal sin within the U.K. 
Foreign Office to put up a policy submission that did not clearly recite 
that the Legal Adviser or his staff had been consulted, or that did not 
include an analysis of the legal questions that were relevant to the 
decision. If the submission did not contain this, then any legitimate 
senior official or minister would send it back for a complete analysis to 
know what the law stated.108 
The United States would do well to adopt a similar internal rule requiring 
the Legal Adviser’s input on policy matters involving international law. As 
Davis Robinson summed up: “The main lesson that I drew from my days in 
L is that, if the U.S. Government is to realize the full benefit of the 
potential contribution of its international lawyers, the lawyers need to 
participate from the beginning of a takeoff in policy and not just in a crash 
landing whenever things go wrong.”109 
 
 
 106. Stephen M. Schwebel, Remarks on the Role of the Legal Advisor of the US State Department, 
2 EUR. J. INT’L L. 132, 134 (1991). 
 107. Robinson, supra note 101, at 60. 
 108. Sir Frank Berman, Foreign Legal Advisers’ Roundtable, in SCHARF & WILLIAMS, SHAPING 
FOREIGN POLICY, supra note 20, at 178 (citation omitted). 
 109. Robinson, supra note 101, at 55. 
